

# Time and Being

## A translation of Martin Heidegger's "*Zeit und Sein*"

Gerry Stahl

Northwestern University, 1970

The following lecture requires a short forward.

If two pictures which Paul Klee created in the year of his death, the watercolor "The holy one from a window" and "Death and fire" in temper on cloth, were shown to us in the original we would wish to linger long before them and would give up every claim to immediate comprehension.

If the poem "Seven songs of death" could be recited for us now, and by the poet Georg Trakl himself, then we would like to hear it often and would give up every claim to immediate comprehension.

If Werner Heisenberg presented to us some of his thoughts in theoretical physics on the way to the world-formula that he seeks, then perhaps at best two or three of the listeners could follow him; the rest of us would however unquestioningly give up every claim to immediate comprehension.

However, it is different with the thinking called philosophy. Because it is supposed to offer "worldly wisdom" or even "instruction for the blessed life." Philosophy may, however, be placed in a position today which requires reflections far removed from a practical wisdom about life. It may have become necessary to think about that from which the forenamed painting, poetry and physics receive their determination. We must, then, here too give up the claim to immediate comprehension; we must in this too listen, because the point is to think about what is uncommon but preliminary.

Therefore, it should be neither surprising nor bewildering if most of the listeners have difficulty with this lecture. Whether some succeed with it now or in a future reflection cannot be known. Something should now be said about the attempt to think about Being without reference to a grounding of Being in beings. The attempt to think about Being without beings has become necessary because, it seems to me, otherwise there is no possibility of bringing the Being of that which today *is* around the Earth's sphere truly into view, not to mention of adequately determining the relation of man to what has been called "Being."

A small hint is given for listening: the point is not to listen to a string of declarative sentences, but to follow the movement of exhibition.

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What gives us the opportunity to name Time and Being together? From the beginning of Western European thought until today, Being has meant the same as being present. From being present, presence connotes the present. According to the usual conception, the present characterizes Time with the past and the future. Being is determined by Time as presence. This relationship alone could suffice to bring thought to a ceaseless unrest. This unrest increases as soon as we decide to reflect upon the extent to which this determination of Being by Time is given.

The extent? This asks where, how and why something like Time speaks in Being. Every attempt to think adequately about the relationship of Being and Time with the help of the common and approximate conceptions of Time and Being becomes immediately entangled in a mesh of connections which have barely been thought through.

We name Time when we say everything has its time. This means, every being that ever is, comes and goes at the right time and remains for a length of time, during the time allotted it. Everything has its time.

But is Being a thing? Is Being like some being in Time? Is Being at all? If it were to be, then we would certainly have to recognize it as a being and thus find it as such among the other beings. This lecture hall *is*. This lecture hall *is* lighted. We immediately recognize the lighted hall as a being. But where in the whole hall do we find the "is"? Nowhere among the things do we find Being. Everything has its time. But Being is not a thing. Being is not in Time. However, Being as presence, as the present, remains determined by Time, by the temporal.

That which is in Time and thus determined by Time is called the temporal. We say that when a man dies and is taken from the here and now, he has left the temporal. The temporal means the passing, that which passes as time runs on. Our language says this even more exactly: that which passes with Time. Because Time itself passes. But Time remains as Time in that it continually passes. Remain means: not disappear, that is, be present. With this, Time is determined by a Being. Then how can Being remain determined by Time? Being speaks out of the permanence of the passing of Time. However, we never find Time in front of us like a thing.

Being is not a thing, therefore nothing temporal, yet it is determined by Time as presence.

Time is not a thing, therefore not a being, yet it remains permanent in its passing, without itself being something temporal like beings in Time.

Being and Time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a way that neither can Being be claimed to be temporal nor Time to be a being. All of this that has been reflected on we are stating in contradictory statements.

Philosophy knows a way out for such cases. One lets the contradictions stand, even sharpens them, and attempts to put the contradictory and mutually exclusive parts together in an encompassing unity. This method is called dialectic. Granted that the mutually contradictory statements about Being and about Time could be put in harmony by an encompassing unity, then this should indeed be a way out, namely a way which dodged the subjects and their state of affairs since it would discuss neither Being as such nor Time as such nor their relationship. The question has been

completely ignored here whether the relationship of Being and Time is one which can be produced by a combining of the two or whether Being *and* Time names a state of affairs out of which are first given both Being and Time.

Yet, how are we to begin appropriately with the state of affairs named by the titles “Being and Time,” “Time and Being”?

Answer: by contemplating the named subjects carefully. Carefully—this means to avoid overtaking the subjects with uninvestigated conceptions, rather to reflect upon them with care.

However, can we refer to Being and Time as subjects? They are not subjects, since “subject” means a being. The word “subject,” “a subject,” will now mean for us that with which we are concerned in a significant sense, in so far as something that cannot be neglected is hidden in it. Being—a subject, possibly *the* subject of thought.

Time—a subject, possibly *the* subject of thought, since something like Time speaks in Being as presence. Being *and* Time, Time *and* Being name the relationship of both subjects, the state of affairs which holds both subjects together and sustains their relationship. It is given to thought to reflect on this state of affairs if it remains inclined towards its subject.

Being—a subject, but not a being.

Time—a subject, but nothing temporal.

We say of a being: it is. Concerning the subject “Being” and the subject “Time,” we remain careful, we do not say: Being is, Time is, but: it gives<sup>1</sup> Being and it gives Time. So far, we have only used an alternative expression. Instead of saying, “it is,” we say, “it gives.”

In order to get back to the subject and away from the expression, we must demonstrate how this “It gives” is experienced and caught sight of. The appropriate way to do this is to discuss what is given in the “It gives,” what “Being” means which—It gives; what “Time means—which It gives. Accordingly, we try to look at the It that *gives* Being and Time. This way we will be careful in another sense. We try to bring the It and its giving into view and capitalize the “It.”

We reflect on Being first to think about it itself in terms of what is proper to it.

Then we reflect on Time to think about it itself in terms of what is proper to it.

Thereby the manner must show itself in which Being is given, in which Time is given. In this giving it will become clear how that giving is to be determined which, as a relationship, first holds both together and gives them forth.

Being, through which every being is determined as such, signifies being present. Considered in view of the thing present, presence shows itself as letting-be-present. Now this letting-be-present

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<sup>1</sup> The German phrase, “*es gibt*,” has the idiomatic meaning, “there is (are).” However, because of Heidegger’s use of its root meaning, the phrase is herein translated as “it gives.”

must itself be considered, insofar as being present is allowed. Letting-be-present shows what is proper to it in that it brings into un-concealment. Being-present means disclosing, bringing into the open. A giving is at play in disclosure, namely that which gives being-present, i.e., gives Being, in *letting-be-present*.

To consider the subject “Being” appropriately requires that our reflection follow the direction that shows itself in letting-be-present. Disclosure shows in letting-be-present. A giving, an It gives, speaks in this disclosure.

So far, this giving remains as dark for us as the “It” which gives.

To think properly about Being itself requires us to stop looking at Being in so far as it is described as in all metaphysics only in terms of beings and as their ground. To think about Being appropriately requires us to discard Being as the ground of beings in favor of Being as the playful giving which is hidden in disclosure, i.e., Being as the It gives. Being belongs to the giving as the given of this It gives. Being as the gift is not thrown out from the giving. Being, being-present, is transformed. As letting-be-present, it belongs in disclosure, it remains contained in the giving as its gift. Being *is* not. It gives Being as the disclosure of presence.

The “It gives Being” may appear clearer as soon as we reflect more decisively on the giving under consideration. This reflection will succeed if we take notice of the wealth of changes of what is vaguely enough called Being. That which is most proper to Being is missed as long as it is held to be the emptiest of empty concepts. This conception of Being as the purely abstract is still not discarded in principle, but rather confirmed when Being as the purely abstract is raised into the purely concrete of the reality of absolute spirit, as took place in the most violent thinking of modern times, in Hegel’s speculative dialectic, and as it is presented in his *Science of Logic*.

The attempt to reflect upon the changes of Being wins its first and directing support by our thinking about Being in the sense of being-present.

Thinking, I mean, and not mimicking and acting as if the explication of Being as being-present were obvious.

Where do we get the right to characterize Being as being-present? The question comes too late. Because this characterization of Being was decided upon long ago without our participation or even our help. Henceforth we have been tied to the characterization of Being as being-present. It has its necessity since the beginning of the disclosure of Being as something say-able, that is, something thinkable. Since the beginning of Western thought with the Greeks, all talk about “Being” and “is” has kept in mind the determination of Being as being-present which binds thought. This is also true of thinking influenced by the most modern technology and industry, of course only in a certain sense. Since modern technology established its reach and mastery over the entire Earth, it is not mainly the Sputniks and their followers which encircle the Earth, but rather Being as being-present in the sense of calculable stock, which is imposed on everyone on Earth—without the inhabitants of the non-European parts of the Earth knowing anything about it or wishing or being able to know anything about the origin of this determination of Being. Such knowledge would least of all be able to reveal the commercial developers, who today push the so-called under-developed people within

hearing distance of that claim of Being which speaks out of what is most proper to modern technology.

By no means do we perceive Being as being-present first and only in contemplation of the early display of the disclosure of Being which the Greeks achieved. We perceive presence in every simple, unprejudiced concentration upon the presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand of beings. Presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are modes of being present. The all-encompassing character of being-present shows itself most forcefully when we realize that even being absent remains determined by a being present which is occasionally intensified to the uncanny.

We can also determine the changes of being-present historically with the indication that presence showed itself as *hen* (the unifying unique-unity), as *logos* (the collection which preserves all), *idea*, *ousia*, *energia*, *substantia*, *actualitas*, *perceptio*, *monad*, as objectivity, as the positing of self-setting in the sense of the will of reason, of love, of spirit, of power, as will to will in the eternal recurrence of the same. The historically determinable can be found within the study of history. The development of the changes of Being looks at first like a history of Being. But Being does not have a history like a state or a folk has a history. The manner in which the history of Being is historical is determined by and only by the way in which Being happens. According to the previous argument, this means by the way in which It gives Being.

In the beginning of the disclosure of Being, Being was thought about—*einai* and *eon*—but not the “It gives.” Instead, Parmenides said: *estin gar einai*, “It is namely Being.”

Years ago (1947) it was mentioned in the *Letter on Humanism* (p. 23) that, “Parmenides’ ‘*estin gar einai*’ is still not thought through today.” This hint was to remark that we must not underlay the quoted speech—“it is namely Being”—too quickly with a handy analysis which makes the thoughts in it unapproachable. Whatever we say is, is conceived of as a being. But Being is not a being. Therefore, the “*esti*” emphasized in Parmenides’ sentence, the Being to which it refers, cannot be conceived of as a being. While the emphasized “*esti*” is literally translated as “it is,” the emphasis connotes what the Greeks already understood by “*esti*” and which we can express with: “It permits.” However, the meaning of this permission remained as un-thought for the Greeks and later as the “It” which permits Being. To permit Being means: to deliver Being up and give it. The It gives is hidden in the *esti*.

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In the beginning of Western thought, Being was thought about, but not the “It gives” as such. This withdrew, leaving the gift that It gives. This gift was later thought about and conceptualized exclusively as Being in relation to beings.

A giving that only gives its gift but holds itself back and withdraws we call a sending. In this sense of giving, Being that is given is history. Each change of Being remains so sent. The historicity of the history of Being is determined by the fatefulness of a sending, but by an indefinitely meant occurrence.

History of Being (*Geschichte*) means destiny (*Geschick*) of Being, in which sending both the sending (*Schicken*) and the It that sends restrain themselves with the manifestation of themselves. To restrain oneself is called *epoche* in Greek. Hence the talk of epochs of the sending of Being.

Epoch does not here mean a temporal slice of an occurrence, but the main feature of the sending, the continuous restraining of itself for the sake of the perceptibility of the gift, i.e., of Being with respect to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be considered necessary. However, the sending manifests itself in the destiny of the epochs; the commensurability manifests itself in the sequentiality of the epochs. These epochs cover themselves over in turn, so that the original sending of Being as being-present is hidden more and more in various ways.

Only the dismantling of this cover—that is, its “destruction”—creates for thought a preliminary glimpse into that which then reveals itself as Being’s destiny. Because Being’s destiny was everywhere conceived merely as history and this as a process, it was vainly attempted to explain this process on the basis of what was said in *Being and Time* about the historicity of Dasein (not of Being). Rather the only possible way to consider the later thoughts on Being’s destiny on the basis of *Being and Time* remains to think through that which was presented there on the destruction of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings.

If Plato conceived of Being as *idea* and as the *koinonia* of ideas, Aristotle as *energia*, Kant as positing, Hegel as the absolute concept and Nietzsche as will to power, then these are not accidentally appearing doctrines, but words of Being as answers to the exhortation which speaks in the self-concealing sending, in the “It gives Being.” Always contained in the self-withdrawing sending, Being is hidden from thought by its abundance of epochal changes. Thought remains bound in the tradition of the epochs of Being’s destiny also and especially when one is mindful of how Being itself always receives its proper determination, namely from the It gives Being. The giving shows itself as sending.

But how can one think about the “It” that gives Being? The introductory remark about the placing together of “Time and Being” pointed out the Being as being-present, as the present, is determined in an as yet indefinite sense by a temporal character and thereby by Time. From this it was easy to presume that the It, which gives Being and which determines Being as being-present and letting-be-present, could be found in that which is called “Time” in “Time and Being.”

We follow this presumption and contemplate Time. “Time” is known to us through common conceptions in the same way as “Being” is, but it is also unknown in the same way as soon as we propose to describe that which is proper to Time. When we contemplated Being we saw: that which is proper to Being, that to which it belongs and that in which it remains contained, shows itself as sending in the It gives and in its giving. That which is proper to Being is not Being-like. When we think about Being properly, then the subject itself leads us away from Being and we think about destiny, which gives Being as a gift. By noticing this we convince ourselves that what is proper to Time can also not be determined with the help of the ordinary characteristics of the commonly imagined Time. The placement together of Time and Being does however contain the indication to describe Time in its proper terms with an eye to what was said about Being. Being means being-present, letting-be-present, presence. We read somewhere, for instance, “The festival took place in the presence of numerous guests.” The sentence could also run, with numerous guests “present.”

The present—we barely name it before we also think of past and future, the earlier and the later in contrast to now. However, the present as understood on the basis of now is not at all the same as the

present in the sense of the presence of the guests. We never do or could say, “The festival took place in the now of numerous guests.”

However, if we should characterize Time on the basis of the present, we understand the present as the now in contrast to the no-longer-now of the past and the not-yet-now of the future. But the present entails presence. We are not used to determining what is proper to Time on the basis of the present in the sense of presence. Rather, Time—the unity of present, past and future—is conceived on the basis of the now. Aristotle already said that which *is*, i.e., which is present, of Time is the respective now. Past and future are a *me on ti*: something which is not a being but not simply nothing, rather something present from which something is lacking as indicated by the “no-longer” and “not-yet” now. So viewed, Time appears as the one-after-another of nows, of which each, barely named, already disappears in the just and is already followed by the forthwith. Kant said of Time so conceived, “It has only one dimension” (*Critique of pure Reason*, A31, B47). When one measures and calculates Time, one uses Time known as a sequence of nows. It seems as though we have the calculated Time directly in front of us when we hold a watch, look at the hands and determine, “Now it is 8:50 p.m.” We say “now” and mean Time. But we do not find Time anywhere on the watch which gives us the time, neither on the dial nor in the works. Just as little do we find Time on a modern technical chronometer. The claim arises: the more technical, i.e., the more exact in measurement the chronometer, the less the possibility to contemplate what is proper to Time.

But where is Time? Is it and does it have a place? Clearly, Time is not nothing. Therefore, we remained careful and said, It gives Time. We become even more careful and look carefully at that which shows itself to us as Time, in that we take a preliminary look at Being in the sense of presence, of the present. However, the present in the sense of presence is so vastly different from the present in the sense of now that the present as presence can in no way be determined by the present as now. The reverse seems more possible (see *Being and Time* §81). If this is so, then the present as presence and all that belongs to such a present must be called proper Time, even if it has nothing directly in common with the ordinary conception of Time in the sense of the sequence of calculable nows.

So far, we have neglected to show more clearly what the present in the sense of presence means. Through this, Being is unitarily determined as being-present and letting-be-present, i.e., as disclosure. What subject do we think about when we say being-present? Being (of being-present) means endurance. But we too quickly consider enduring as mere duration and take duration according to the usual conception of Time as a temporal stretch from one now to a later now. However, the talk about being-present demands that we conceive duration as lingering and abiding. Being-present is of concern to us; the present means abide towards us, us—man.

Who are we? We remain cautious with the answer. Because it could be that that which distinguishes man as man is itself determined by that which we must think about here: man, who is concerned with being-present, who is present in his own way out of such concern to all which is present and absent.

Man is in the midst of concern for being-present, but in such a way that he receives as a gift the being-present that It gives, in so far as he perceives that which appears in letting-be-present. If man were not the constant receiver of the gift from the “It gives being-present,” if he did not get what is

given in the gift, then not only would Being remain hidden and locked away, but man would remain shut out of the realm of the It give Being. Man would not be man.

Now, it seems that with the indication about man, we have come off the path on which we would like to contemplate what is proper to Time. In a sense, this is so. At the same time, we are closer than we imagine to the subject called Time, which should properly be seen on the basis of the present as presence.

Presence entails the constant abiding which concerns man, which is reached by him, which reaches him. But whence this reached reaching with which the present as being-present belongs in so far as presence is given? Granted, man remains always concerned with the being-present of some present being, without thereby truly paying attention to being-present itself. But just as often, i.e., always, we are concerned about being-absent. Sometimes so that much is not present in the way in which we know it from being-present in the sense of the present. Yet, also this no-longer-present is directly present in its being-absent, namely in the manner of the having-been-present which concerns us. This does not fall away out of the previous now like the merely past. The having-been-present is rather present in its own way. Being-present is rather present in its own way. Being-present is reached in such having-been-present.

Being-absent also concerns us in the sense of the not-yet-present in the manner of being-present in the sense of coming-towards-us. Talk about coming-towards us has become jargon. One now hears, "The future has already begun," which is not the case, because the future never first begins, in so far as being-absent as the being-present of the not-yet-present always already concerns us in some way, i.e., is present in some way, just as directly as that which has-been-present. Being-present is reached in the future, in coming-towards-us.

If we pay more careful attention to what is said, we find in being-absent, whether that of the past or the future, a manner of being-present and of concern which in no way corresponds to being-present in the sense of the immediately present. Thus, it should be noticed that not every being-present is necessarily in the present, strangely enough. And we do find such being-present, namely that concern which reaches us, also in the present. Being-present is also reached in the present.

How shall we determine this reaching of being-present, which is at play in the past, present and future? Does this reaching consist in reaching us, or does it reach us because it is a reaching? The later. Coming-towards as not-yet-present reaches and brings at the same time the no-longer-present, the past, and conversely the past reaches the future. The interplay of these two reaches and brings the present at the same time. We say "at the same time" and thereby assign a temporal character to the reaching-each-other of future, past and present, i.e., to their proper unity.

This procedure is clearly not appropriate if we must call this unity of reaching and just this "Time." Because Time is itself nothing temporal, any more than it is a being. Therefore we are forbidden from saying that future, past and present are "at the same time" present-at-hand. However, their reaching-each-other does belong together. Their unifying unity can only be determined on the basis of what is proper to them, out of their reaching each other. But what do they reach to each other?

Nothing but themselves and that means: the being-present that is reached in them. With this what we call Time-space opens up. However, with the word Time we no longer mean the sequence of



nows. Thus, Time-space no longer means the separation of two points of calculated Time as when we determine that such and such happened in the temporal space of 50 years. Time-space now names the open, which is cleared in the reaching-each-other of future, past and present. The possible expanse for the ordinarily known space is cleared first and only by this openness. The clearing reaching-each-other of the future, past and present is itself pre-spatial; only thereby can it grant, i.e., give, room.

The ordinarily understood Time-space in the sense of a measured separation of two temporal points is the result of temporal calculation. Through it, Time conceived as a line and parameter and thereby one-dimensionally is numerically measured off. The dimensionality of Time so considered as the sequence of nows is borrowed from the representation of three-dimensional space.

That which is proper to the Time-space of proper Time is due to the clearing reaching-each other of future, past and present before and independently of any temporal calculation. Thus, proper Time and only it is suitable to what we easily mistakenly call dimension. This suitability is due to the characterized clearing reaching, which as the future gives the past, as the past gives the future and as both of these movements gives the clearing of the openness. Thought in terms of this three-fold reaching, proper Time shows itself to be three-dimensional. To repeat—dimension is not here considered as the range of possible measuring, but as the reaching through, as the clearing reaching. This first permits a range of measurement to be considered and delimited.

But whence is the unity of the three dimensions of proper Time determined, i.e., of the three ways of reaching of their respective proper being-present, which ways play in each other? We already heard that a kind of concern and bringing, i.e., being-present, plays respectively in the coming-towards of the not-yet-present as well as in the having-been of the no-longer-present and in the present itself. We cannot assign this so conceived being-present to one of the three dimensions, like to the present. The unity of the three temporal dimensions is due much more to the interplay of each with each. This interplay shows itself to be the proper reaching that plays in that which is proper to Time as if it were the fourth dimension—and not only as if, but as it is on the basis of the subject.

Proper Time is four-dimensional.

What we have counted as fourth is first according to the subject, i.e., it is the reaching that determines everything. In the future, past and present, it brings the being-present that is properly theirs, it holds them cleared apart and it holds them together in the nearness from which the three dimensions remain sewn together. Hence, we name this first, original reaching, in which the unity of proper Time consists, the nearing near, “nearness”—an early word which Kant had already used. But it brings future, past and present near each other by distancing them. Because it holds the past open by denying its future as the present. This nearing of the near holds the coming-towards out of the future open by withholding the present in coming. The nearing near has the character of denial and withholding. It holds the manners of reaching of past, future and present together in their unity in advance.

Time is not. It gives Time. The giving which gives Time determines itself by the denying-withholding near. It furnishes the open of Time-space and preserves what is denied in the past and what remains withdrawn in the future. We name the giving which gives proper Time the clearing-

concealing reaching. In so far as the reaching is itself a giving, the giving of a gift conceals itself in proper Time.

But where are Time and Time-space? However forceful the question may at first seem, we must no longer ask in such a manner about a where, a place of Time. Because proper time itself, the domain of the nearing near, is the pre-spatial vicinity through which a possible where is first given.

Since its beginning, philosophy asked where Time belonged whenever it contemplated Time. One primarily had in mind calculated Time as the passage of a sequence of nows. One explained that counted Time, with which we calculate, could not be given without *psyche*, without *animus*, without soul, without consciousness, without spirit. Time is not given without man. But what does this “not without” mean? Is man the giver of Time or its receiver? And if the later, how does man receive Time? Is man first man in order to sometime (i.e., at some time) receive Time and take up a connection to it? Proper Time is the nearness of being-present from present, past and future that unifies its three-fold clearing reaching. It has reached man in such a way that he can only be man by standing in the three-fold reaching and enduring its characteristic denying-withholding nearness. Time is not a product of man; man is not a product of Time. No making is given here. There is only the giving in the sense of the aforementioned reaching that clears Time-space.

However, granted that the manner of giving in which Time is given needs the present characterization, we still stand before the puzzling It, which we name in saying: It gives Time. It gives Being. The danger arises that we arbitrarily apply an indeterminate power with the naming of the “It,” a power that supposedly achieves all giving of Being and of Time. We can offset the indeterminacy and the arbitrariness by sticking with the characterization of the giving which we tried to show on the basis of the foresight into Being as being-present and into Time as the domain of the reaching of the clearing of a manifold being-present. The giving in “It gives Being” shows itself as sending and as the destiny of being-present in its epochal changes.

The giving in “It gives Time” shows itself as the clearing reaching of the four-dimensional domain.

In so far as the likes of Time announces itself in Being as being-present, the previous suspicion is strengthened that proper Time, the four-fold reaching of the open, lets itself be discovered as the “It” that gives Being, i.e., being-present. The suspicion seems fully justified if we notice that being-absent also always announces itself as a form of being-present. Now, that manner of clearing reaching, which gives all being-present in the open, shows itself in the past, which allows the no-longer-present to be present by denying the present, and shows itself in the coming-towards-us, which allows the not-yet-present to be present by withholding the present.

Thus, proper Time appears as the It which we name in saying, It gives Being. Destiny, in which Being is given, consists in the reaching of Time. Does Time prove itself in the demonstration to be the It which gives Being?—By no means. Because Time itself remains the gift of an It gives, whose giving preserves the domain in which being-present is reached. The It thus remains indeterminate, puzzling, and we remain puzzled. In such a case it is advisable to determine the It, which gives, on the basis of the previously characterized giving. This shows itself as the sending of Being, as Time in the sense of the clearing reaching.

Or are we only puzzled because we are letting language, or rather the grammatical analysis of language, lead us into an error in which we stare at an It which is supposed to be given but which is simply not given. When we say, It gives Being, It gives Time, we are speaking sentences. Grammatically, a sentence consists of subject and predicate. Its subject need not necessarily be a subject in the sense of an I or a person. Grammar and logic use the It-sentence as an impersonal and as a subject-less sentence. In other Indo-Germanic languages, in Greek and Latin, the It is lacking, at least as a special word and sound complex. But that does not mean that what is meant by the It is not thought: in the Latin *pluit*, it is raining; in the Greek *cre*, it is necessary.

But what does this “It” mean? Linguistics and philosophy of language have contemplated this extensively without a good clarification having been found. The domain of meaning meant by the It reaches from the insignificant to the demonic. The It said in the talk of “It gives Being,” “It gives Time” may name something exceptional which cannot be gone into here. Therefore, we limit ourselves to a fundamental consideration.

According to the grammatico-logical analysis, that which is talked about shows itself as the subject, *hypokeimenon*, the already lying there somehow present-being. What is said about the subject as predicate shows itself as the already present-being-with with the present-being, the *symbebekos*, *accidens*: the lecture hall is lighted. In the “It” of the “It gives Being,” a being-present of something which is present, thus in a certain sense a Being, speaks. If we put this in place of the It, then the sentence, “It gives Being,” says as much as Being gives Being. With that we are thrown back to the difficulty stated at the lecture’s start: Being is. But Being “is” just as little as Time “is.” So let us drop the attempt to characterize the “It” in isolation. But let us retain in view that the It names, at least in the most readily available analysis, a being-present of being-absent.

In saying, “It gives Being,” “It gives Time,” we are not dealing with propositions about beings, although the sentence structure has been passed down by the Greco-Roman grammarians entirely with such propositions in mind. In view of this, we must be alert to the possibility that in saying, “It gives Being,” “It gives Time,” we are not, despite all appearances, dealing with propositions which are frozen in the sentence structure of the subject-predicate connection. But how else can we bring into view the “It” which is said in “It gives Being,” “It gives Time”? Simply by thinking of the “It” on the basis of the kind of giving which belongs to it: giving as destiny, giving as clearing reaching, Both belong together insofar as the former, destiny, consists in the later, clearing reaching.

In the sending of the destiny of Being and in the reaching of Time a dedication, a transfer, shows itself, namely of Being as presence and of Time as the domain of the open to what is proper to them. What determines both, Time and Being, in what is proper to them, i.e., in their belonging together, we call *the appropriating happening (das Ereignis)*.<sup>2</sup> What this word means we can only think about out of what announces itself in the fore-sight of Being and of Time as destiny and as

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<sup>2</sup> The German word “*Ereignis*” commonly means “event,” but is used by Heidegger in a way that makes “appropriating happening,” with its etymology and connotations, a more proper or appropriate translation for this central term of Heidegger’s later writings. The term “happening” does not necessarily denote an event of short duration and carries more of a processual sense of a verb than a noun or a being.

reaching, in which Time and Being belong. We called both, Being as well as Time, subjects. The “and” between them left their connection to one another indeterminate.

Now we see that what lets both subjects belong to each other, what not only brings both subjects into what is proper to them, but preserves them in their belonging together and holds them in it, the relation of the two subjects, the subject-relation, is the appropriating happening. The subject-relation is not tacked on to Being and Time later as a stuck-on relationship. The subject-relation first appropriates Being and Time out of their relationship to what is proper to them and through the appropriation that hides itself in destiny and in clearing reaching. Hence, the It, which gives, certifies itself as the appropriating happening in “It gives Being,” “It gives Time.” The proposition is correct and yet at the same time false, i.e., it hides the subject-relation from us; because unnoticed we have imagined it as something being present, while we are trying to think about presence as such. But perhaps we can have all the difficulties, all the detailed and apparently fruitless descriptions removed if we finally ask the simple question: What is the appropriating happening?

An intermediate question is allowed here: What do “to answer” and “the answer” mean here? To answer means to say that which speaks to the subject matter that is to be thought about here, i.e., the appropriating happening. But if the subject matter forbids talking about it in the manner of a proposition, then we must renounce the proposition with is anticipated by the posed question. However, this means accepting the impossibility of thinking appropriately about what is to be thought about. Or is it more advisable to renounce not only the answer, but even the question? Because what is the status of this illuminatingly qualified, candidly posed question: what is the appropriating happening? Here we are questioning the what-ness, the essence, the way in which the appropriating happening is, i.e., is-present.

With the apparently harmless question—What is the appropriating happening?—we seek information about the Being of the appropriating happening. But if Being now proves to be something which belongs in the appropriating happening and which receives the characterization of presence from it, then we fall back with our question to that which above all else is missing its characterization: Being from Time. This characterization shows itself out of the fore-sight of the “It” which gives, in looking through the intertwined manners of giving, sending and reaching. Sending of Being is based in the clearing-concealing reaching of the manifold being-present in the open domain of Time-space. But reaching is based together with sending in the appropriating happening. This, i.e., this that is proper to the appropriating happening, also determines the sense of that which is here called being based.

What has now been said permits—in a sense, necessitates—saying how the appropriating happening is not to be thought about. We can no longer understand what is named the “appropriating happening” on the basis of the word’s common meaning, because that would be to understand it in the sense of occurring or process—not on the basis of making proper as the cleared preserving reaching and sending.

Thus, for instance, it is announced that the unifying of the European Common Market is an event of world-historical significance. If the word “*Ereignis*” appears in connection with a description of Being and if one hears this word only with the ordinary meaning of “event,” then it clearly obtrudes

upon speaking of the event of Being. Because without Being, no being can be as such. Accordingly, Being can be taken for the highest, for the most important event.

But the whole point of this lecture was to bring into view Being itself *as* the appropriating happening. Only that which is named with the word “*Ereignis*” says something completely different. Accordingly, the “as,” which is unapparent and always entangled because ambiguous, must also be thought about. Even assuming that we forsake the usual meaning of the word “*Ereignis*” for the description of Being and Time and instead use the meaning given in the sending of presence and the clearing reaching of Time-space, then the talk about “Being as appropriating” is still indefinite.

“Being as appropriating”—earlier, philosophy thought about Being on the basis of beings as *idea*, as *energia*, as *actualitas*, as will and now—one might think—as the appropriating happening. So understood, the appropriating happening means a transformed explication of Being, which, if it is valid, presents an advance in metaphysics. In such a case, the “as” would mean the appropriating happening as a kind of Being, ordered under Being, which would form the retained main concept. But if we think in the manner attempted of Being in the sense of being-present and letting-be-present which is given in destiny, which in turn depends upon the cleared-concealed reaching of proper time, then Being belongs to the appropriating happening. From this the giving and its gift receive their determination. Then Being would be a kind of appropriating happening and not the appropriating happening a kind of Being.

The flight to such a reversal would be too cheap. It would pass by the state of affairs in thinking. The appropriating happening is not the encompassing highest concept under which Being and Time can be ordered. Logical ordering connections have nothing to say here. Because by our reflecting upon Being itself and by following what is proper to it, it proves itself to be the gift of the destiny of being-present which is preserved in the reaching of Time. The gift of being-present is the property of the appropriating happening. Being vanishes in the appropriating happening. In the expression, “Being as the appropriating happening,” the “as” now means: Being, letting-be-present sent in the appropriating happening, Time reached in the appropriating happening. Time and Being appropriated in the appropriating happening. And what about this appropriating happening itself? Can more be said about the appropriating happening?

More has been thought here than was properly stated, namely that to giving as sending there belongs a restraint, namely that in the reaching of past and future a denial and withholding of present are at play. What are now named—restraint, denial, withholding—show the likes of a self-removal or a pulling-back. However, as long as the manners of giving, sending and reaching are determined by and dependent upon the appropriating happening, pulling back must belong to what is proper to the appropriating happening. A discussion of this is beyond the scope of the present lecture.

With brevity and insufficiently, according to the manner of a lecture, we have hinted at what is proper in the appropriating happening.

The sending in the destiny of Being was characterized as a giving, whereby the sent restrained itself and in its restraining removed itself from disclosure.

In proper Time and its Time-space, the reaching of the past, i.e., of the no-longer-present, shows the denial of the present. In the reaching of the future, i.e., of the not-yet-present, is shown the withholding of the present. Denial and withholding announce the same pulling as the restraint in sending, namely the self-removal.

In so far as the destiny of Being is due to the reaching of Time and they are together due to the appropriating happening, that which is proper, which removes its most proper self from the unrestrained disclosure, is announced in the appropriating happening. Considered in terms of the appropriating happening, this means that It expropriates itself in the named sense of itself. To the appropriating happening as such belongs expropriation. The appropriating happening does not give itself up in this, but rather preserves its property.

We glimpse the other thing which is proper to the appropriating happening as soon as we think clearly enough about what has already been stated. In Being as being-present, is announced the process which concerns us men so, that we have acquired the characteristic of humanity in the perception and acceptance of this concern. This acceptance of the process of being-present is however due to standing within the region of reaching, as which four-dimensional proper Time has reached us.

In so far as Being and Time are only given in appropriation, to this belongs the proper, which brings man into what is proper to him as he who perceives Being by standing within proper Time. As such, man properly belongs in the appropriating happening.

This belonging is due to the making proper that characterizes the appropriating happening. Through it, man is let into the appropriating happening. Because of this, we can never stand the appropriating happening in front of ourselves, neither as an object nor as something all-encompassing. Therefore, representational-founding thinking accords with the appropriating happening as little as merely propositional speech.

In so far as both Time and Being as the giving of the appropriating happening can only be thought about on the basis of the later, the relationship of space to the appropriating happening must accordingly be considered. This can clearly only succeed when we have already seen into the origin of space in the sufficiently considered proper view of place. (See "Build Live Think," 1951, in *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, Heidegger, 1954, p. 145ff.)

The attempt in *Being and Time* §70 to trace the spatiality of Dasein back to temporality cannot be ended.

In peering through Being itself, through Time itself, in glancing at the destiny of Being and the reaching of Time-space, what "*Ereignis*" says becomes glimpse-able. But do we gain anything but a mere edifice of thoughts in this way? In the retention of this suspicion speaks the opinion that the appropriating happening must after all "be" a being. However, the appropriating happening neither *is* nor is it *given*. To say either is to confuse the state of affairs, just as if we wanted to lead a spring out of its stream.

What remains to be said? The appropriating happening appropriates. With this, we say the same from the same to the same. This appears to say nothing. And it does say nothing as long as we hear what is said as a mere sentence and surrender its examination to logic. But what if we accept what

was said inescapably as the topic of concern for contemplation and consider that this same is not something new, but the oldest of the old in Western thought, the ancient that hides itself in the name *a-lethia*? From that which was dictated in this beginning of all leit motifs of thought, a constraint speaks which binds every thinking, assuming it heeds the call of that which is to be thought about.

The point was to think about Being proper by peering through proper Time—on the basis of the appropriating happening—without reference to the connection of Being to beings.

To think about Being without beings means to think about Being without reference to metaphysics. Such a reference is, however, still dominant in the attempt to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, the point is to dispense with overcoming and to abandon metaphysics itself.

If an overcoming remains necessary, then it concerns that thinking which properly has to do with the appropriating happening, in order to say It from it and toward It.

The point is inescapably to overcome the obstacles that easily make such a speaking insufficient.

Speaking about the appropriating happening in the manner of a lecture also remains an obstacle of this sort. It has only been spoken in sentences.

### **Publication note:**

The lecture “Time and Being” was held on January 31, 1962, in the Studium Generale of the University of Freiburg i. Br. under the leadership of Eugen Fink. The title “Time and Being” refers to the outline of “*Being and Time*” (1927, p. 39), the third section of the first Part of the book. The publication of “*Being and Time*” was broken off at this point.

The text of the lecture can no longer be appended three-and-a-half decades after the original publication of the book. Granted, the leading question remains the same; but this just means that the question is even more questionable and the times even stranger.

The lecture was first published in 1968 with a French translation in a Festschrift for Jean Beaufret. It was then published in: Heidegger, M. (1969) *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. 1-26.

The lecture was published in English in: Heidegger, M. (1972) *On Time and Being*. Transl.: Joan Staumbaugh. New York: Harper & Row. 1-24.

The current translation was based on the 1969 publication. Presented at a seminar at Northwestern University in 1970, it was slightly revised in 2015.