The following lecture requires a short forward.

If two pictures which Paul Klee created in the year of his death, the water color "The holy one from a window" and "Death and fire" in tempera on cloth, were shown to us in the original, then we would wish to linger long before them and would give up every claim to immediate comprehension.

If the poem "Seven songs of death" could be recited for us now, and by the poet Georg Trakl himself, then we would like to hear it often and would give up every claim to immediate comprehension.

If Werner Heisenberg presented to us some of his thoughts in theoretical physics on the way to the world-formula which he seeks, then perhaps at best two or three of the listeners could follow him; the rest of us would however unquestioningly give up every claim to immediate comprehension.
But philosophical reflection is supposed to be immediately comprehensible because it is supposed to offer "worldly wisdom" or even "instruction for the good life."

Philosophical thought might, however, be placed in a position which requires today requiring reflections which lie far removed from a practical wisdom about life. A mode of thought could have become necessary which has to think about that which determines physics receive their determination. Since even painting, poetry and mathematics—physical theory.

We must, then, here too give up the claim to immediate comprehension; we must in this too listen, because the point is to think about what is unavoidable but preliminary.

Therefore it should be neither surprising nor bewildering if most of the listeners have difficulty with this lecture. Whether or not some succeed with it now or in a future reflection cannot be known. Something should now be said about the attempt to think about Being without reference to a grounding of Being in beings. The attempt to think about Being without beings has become necessary because, it seems to me, otherwise there is no possibility of bringing the Being of that which today is around the Earth's sphere truly into view, not to mention of adequately determining the relation of man to what has been called "Being".

A small hint is given for the listening: the point is not to listen to a string of declarative sentences, but to follow the movement of demonstration.
What gives us the opportunity to name Time and Being together? From the beginning of Occidental-European thought until today, Being has meant the same as being present. From being present, presence connotes the present. According to the usual conception, the present forms the characteristic of Time with the past and the future. Being is determined by Time as presence. This relationship alone could suffice to bring thought to a ceaseless unrest. This unrest increases as soon as we decide to reflect upon the extent to which this determination of Being by Time is given.

The extent? This asks where, how and why something like Time speaks in Being. Every attempt to think adequately about the relationship of Time to Being with the help of the common and approximate conceptions of Time and Being becomes immediately entangled in a mesh of connections which have barely been thought through.

Everything has its time.

We name Time when we say there is a time for every thing. This means, that which is momentary, every being, comes and goes at the right time and remains for a length of time, during the time allotted it. There is a time for everything.

But is Being a thing? Is Being like some momentary being in Time? Is Being at all? If it were to be, then we would certainly have to recognize it as a being and thus find
it as such among the other beings. This lecture hall is lighted. We recognize the lighted hall as a being, without thinking. But where in the whole hall do we find the "is"? Nowhere among the things do we find Being. There is a time for every thing. But Being is not a thing. Being is not in Time. However, Being as presence, as the present, remains determined by Time, by the temporal.

That which is in Time and thus determined by Time is called the temporal. We say that when a man dies and is taken from the here and now, he has left the temporal. The temporal means the passing, that which passes as time runs on. Our language says this even more exactly: that which passes with Time. Because Time itself passes, but Time remains Time in so far as it continually passes. Remain means not disappear, that is, be present. With this, Time is determined by a Being. Then how can Being remain determined by Time? Being speaks out of the permanence of the passing of Time. However, we never find time in front of us like a thing.

Being is not a thing, therefore nothing temporal, yet it is determined by Time as presence.

Time is not a thing, therefore not a being, yet it remains permanent in its passing, without itself being something temporal like beings in Time.

Being and Time determine each other reciprocally,
but in such a way that neither can Being be claimed to be temporal nor Time to be a being. All of this which has been reflected on we are stating in contradictory statements.

(Philosophy knows a way out for such cases. One lets the contradictions stand, even sharpens them, and attempts to put the contradictory and mutually exclusive parts together in an encompassing unity. This method is called dialectic. Granted that the mutually contradictory statements about Being and about Time could be put in harmony by an encompassing unity, then this would indeed be a way out, namely a way which dodged the subjects and their state of affairs since it would discuss neither Being as such nor Time as such nor their relationship. The question has been completely ignored here whether the relationship of Being and Time is one which can be produced by a combining of the two or whether Being and Time names a state of affairs out of which are first given both Being and Time.)

Yet how are we to begin appropriately with the state of affairs named by the titles "Being and Time", "Time and Being"?

Answer: by contemplating the named subjects carefully. Carefully -- this means to avoid overtaking the subjects with uninvestigated conceptions, rather to reflect upon them with care.
But can we refer to Being and Time as subjects? They are not subjects, since "subject" means a being. The word "subject", "a subject", will now mean for us that with which we are concerned in a significant sense, in so far as something unneglectable is hidden in it. Being -- a subject, possibly the subject of thought.

Time -- a subject, possibly the subject of thought, since something like time speaks in Being as presence. Being and time, Time and Being name the relationship of both subjects, the state of affairs which holds both subjects together and sustains their relationship. It is given to thought to reflect on this state of affairs if it remains inclined towards its subject.

Being -- a subject, but not a being.

Time -- a subject, but nothing temporal.

We say of a being: it is. In regard to the subject "Being" and the subject "Time", we remain careful, we do not say: Being is, Time is, but: it gives*Being and it gives Time. So far we have only used an alternative expression. Instead of saying "it is", we say "It gives."

In order to get back to the subject and away from the expression, we must demonstrate how this "it gives" is

*The German phrase, "es gibt", has the idiomatic meaning, "there is (are)". However, because of Heidegger's use of its root meaning, the phrase is herein translated as "it gives."
experienced and caught sight of. The appropriate way to do this is to discuss what is given in the "It gives," what "Being" means which -- it gives; what "Time" means which -- it gives. Accordingly we try to look at the It which gives Being and Time. This way we will be careful in another sense. We try to bring the It and its giving into view and capitalize the "It".

We reflect on Being first to think about it itself in its proper...

Then we reflect on Time to think about it itself in its proper...

Thereby the manner must show itself in which Being is given, in which Time is given. In this giving it will become clear how that giving is to be determined which, as a relationship, first holds both together and gives them forth.

Being, through which every being is determined as such, signifies being present. Considered in view of the thing present, being present shows itself as letting be present. But now this letting be present must itself be considered, insofar as being present is allowed. Letting be present shows what is its proper, in that it brings into unconcealment. Being present means disclosing, bringing into the open. A giving is at play
in disclosure, namely that which gives being-present, i.e. gives Being, in letting be present.

(To consider the subject "Being" appropriately requires that our reflection follow the direction which shows itself in letting-be-present. Disclosure shows in letting-be-present. However a giving, an It gives, speaks in this disclosure.)

So far, this giving remains as dark for us as the "It" which gives.

To think properly about Being itself, requires us to stop looking at Being in so far as it is described as in all metaphysics only in terms of beings and as their ground. To think about Being appropriately requires us to discard Being as the ground of beings in favor of Being as the playful giving which is hidden in disclosure, i.e. Being as the It gives. Being belongs to the giving as the given of this "It gives". Being as the gift is not thrown out from the giving. Being, being-present, is transformed. As letting-be-present, it belongs in disclosure, it remains contained in the giving as its gift. Being is not. Being is given as the disclosure of presence.

The "It gives Being" may appear clearer as
soon as we reflect more decisively on the giving under consideration. This reflection will succeed if we take notice of the wealth of changes of that which is vaguely enough called Being, that whose most proper is missed as long as it is hold to be the emptiest of empty concepts. This conception of Being as the purely abstract is still not discarded in principle, but rather confirmed when Being as the purely abstract is raised into the purely concrete of the reality of absolute spirit, as took place in the most violent thinking of modern times, in Hegel's speculative dialectic, and as it is presented in his Science of Logic.

The attempt to reflect upon the changes of Being wins its first and directing support by our thinking about being in the sense of being-present.

(Thinking, I mean, and not mimicing and acting as if the explication of Being as being-present were obvious.)

But where do we get the right to characterize Being as being-present? The question comes too late. Because this characterization of Being was decided upon long ago without our participation or even help. Hence forth we have been tied to the characterization of Being as being-present. It has its necessity since the beginning of the disclosure of Being as something sayable, that is something thinkable. Since the beginning of Western thought with the Greeks, all talk about "Being" and "is" has kept in mind the
determination of being as being-present which binds thought. This is also true of thinking influenced by the most modern technology and industry, of course only in a certain sense. Since modern technology established its reach and mastery over the entire Earth, it is not mainly the Sputnics and their followers which encircle the Earth, but rather Being as being-present in the sense of calculable stock which is imposed on everyone on Earth, without the inhabitants of the non-European parts of the Earth knowing anything about it or wishing or being able to know anything about the origin of this determination of Being. (Such knowledge would least of all be able to reveal the commercial developers, who today push the so-called under-developed people within hearing distance of that claim of Being which speaks out of modern technology's most proper.)

By no means do we perceive Being as being-present first and only in contemplation of the early display of the disclosure of Being which the Greeks achieved. We perceive presence in every simple, unprejudiced concentration upon the presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand of beings. Presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand are modes of being present. The encompassingness of being-present shows itself most forcefully when we realize that even being absent remains determined by a being present which is occasionally intensified to the uncanny.
historically with the indication that presence showed itself as  

as ἡ ἦν, the unifying unique-unity, as λόγος, the collection  

which verifies all, ἵδε, ousia, ἐνεργία, substantia, actualitas,  

perceptio,  

mone  

as objectivity, as the establishing of the  

self-establishing in the sense of the will of reason, of love,  

of spirit, of power, as will to will in the eternal recurrence  

of the same. The historically determinable can be found within  

the study of history. The development of the changes of  

Being looks at first like a history of Being. But Being does not  

have a history like a state or a people has a history. The  

manner in which the history of Being is seen is determined  

by and only by the way in which Being happens. According to  

the previous argument, this means by the way in which It  
gives Being.

In the beginning of the disclosure of Being, Being  

was thought about -- ἦν and ὑπό -- but not the "It gives".  

Instead, Parmenides said: estin γιαρ εἰναί, "It is namely Being."

Years ago (1947) it was mentioned in the "Letter on  

Humanism" (p.23) that, "Parmenides' estin γιαρ εἰναί is still  

not thought through today." This hint was to remark that we  

must not underlay the quoted speech -- "it is namely being" --  
too quickly with a handy analysis which makes the thoughts in  

Whatever we say  

it unapproachable. Something of which we say it is, is  

conceived of as a being. But Being is not a being. Therefore  

the estin emphasized in Parmenides' sentence, the Being to which
it refers, cannot be conceived of as a being. While the 
emphasized "esti" is literally translated as "It is", the emphasis 
connotes what the Greeks already understood by "esti" and 
which we can express with "It permits". However, the meaning 
of this permission remained as unthought for the Greeks and 
later as the "It" which permits Being. To permit Being 
means to deliver Being up and give it. The "It gives" is 
hidden in the esti.

In the beginning of Western thought, Being was 
thought about, but not the "It gives" as such. This with- 
drew, leaving the gift which It gives. This gift was later 
thought about and conceptualized exclusively as Being in 
relation to beings.

A giving which only gives its gift but holds itself 
back and withdraws we call a sending. In this sense of giving, 
Being which is given is history. Each change of Being remains 
so sent. The historicity of the history of Being is determined 
by the fatefulness of a sending, not by an indefinitely meant 
happening.

History of Being means destiny of Being, in which 
sending both the sending and the It which sends restrain 
themself with the manifestation of themselves. To restrain 
one oneself is called epoche in Greek. Hence the talk of epochs
of the sending of Being. Epoch does not here mean a temporal slice of a happening, but the main feature of the sending, the continuous restraining of itself for the sake of the perceptibility of the gift, i.e. of Being with respect to the grounding of beings. The sequence of epochs in the destiny of Being is not accidental, nor can it be considered necessary. However, the appropriateness manifests itself in the destiny of the epochs; the commensurability manifests itself in their belonging together. These epochs cover themselves over in turn, so that the original sending of Being as being-present is hidden more and more in various ways.

Only the dismantling of this cover -- that is, its "destruction" -- creates for thought a preliminary glimpse into that which then reveals itself as Being's destiny. Because Being's destiny was everywhere conceived merely as history and this as a process, it was vainly attempted to explain this process on the basis of what was said in Being and Time about the historicity of Dasein (not of Being). Rather the only possible way to consider the later thoughts on Being's destiny on the basis of Being and Time remains to think through that which was presented there on the destruction of the ontological doctrine of the Being of beings.

If Plato conceived of Being as idea and the ideas as koinonia, Aristotle as energia, Kant as position, Hegel as the absolute concept and Nietzsche as will to power, then these are not accidently appearing doctrines, but words of Being as answers
to the exhortation which speaks in the self-concealing sending, in the "It gives Being", in the self-withdrawing hidden from thought, by its abundance of sending, Being is always contained, with its epochal changes, hidden from thought. Thought remains bound in the tradition of the epochs of Being's destiny also and especially when one is mindful of how Being itself always receives its proper determination, namely from the It gives Being. The giving shows itself as sending.

But how can one think about the "It" by which Being is given? The introductory remark about the placing together of "Time and Being" pointed out that Being as being-present, as the present, is determined in an as yet indefinite sense by a temporal character and thereby by Time. From this it was easy to presume that the It by which Being is given and which determines Being as being-present and letting-be-present, could be found in that which is called "Time" in "Time and Being".

We follow this presumption and contemplate Time. "Time" is known to us through common conceptions in the same way as "Being" is, but it is also unknown in the same way as soon as we propose to describe that which is proper to Time. When we contemplated Being we saw: that which is proper to Being, that to which it belongs and that in which it remains contained, shows itself as sending in the It gives and in its gift. That which is proper to Being
is not Being-like. When we think about Being properly, then the subject itself leads us away from Being and we think about destiny, which gives Being as a gift. By noticing this we convince ourselves that the proper of Time can also not be determined with the help of the ordinary characteristics of the commonly imagined Time. The placement together of Time and Being does however contain the indication to describe Time in its proper way with an eye to what was said about Being. Being means being-present, letting-be-present, presence. We read somewhere, for instance, "The festival took place in the presence of numerous guests." The sentence could also run, "with numerous guests present."

The present -- we barely name it before we also think of past and future, the earlier and the later in contrast to now. However, the present as understood on the basis of now is not at all the same as the present in the sense of the presence of the guests. We never do or could say, "The festival took place in the now of numerous guests."

However, if we should determine Time on the basis of the present, we understand the present as the now in contrast to the no-longer-now of the past and the not-yet-now of the future. But the present entails presence. We are not used to determining the character of Time on the basis of the present in the sense of presence. Rather Time -- the unity of present, past and future -- is conceived on the basis of the now. Aristotle already said that which is
i.e. which is present, of Time is the respective now. Past and future are a \( p \mid t \): something which is not a being but not simply nothing, rather something present from which something is lacking as indicated by the "no-longer-" and "not-yet-" now. So viewed, Time appears as the one-after-another of nows, of which each, barely named, already disappears in the just and is already followed by the forthwith. Kant said of Time so conceived, "It has only one dimension." (C. of P. R., A31, B47) When one measures and calculates the Time, one uses the Time known as a sequence of nows. It seems as though we have the calculated Time directly in front of us when we hold a watch, look at the hands and determine, "Now it is 8:50 p.m." We say "now" and mean the Time. But we do not find time anywhere on the watch which gives us the time, neither on the dial nor in the works. Just as little do we find time on a modern technical chronometer. The claim arises: the more technical, i.e. the more exact in measurement the chronometer, the less the possibility to contemplate what is proper to Time.

But where is time? Is it and does it have a place? Clearly Time is not nothing. Therefore we remain careful and say, it gives time. We become even more careful and look carefully at that which shows itself to us as time, in that we take a preliminary look at being in the sense of presence, of the present. Now, the present in the sense of presence is so vastly different from the present in the sense of now that the present as presence can in no way be determined by the present as now. The reverse seems more possible (cf. Being and
Timo, §61). If this is so, then the present as presence and all that belongs to such a present must be called proper Time, even if it has nothing directly in common with the ordinary conception of Time in the sense of the sequence of calculable nows.

So far we have neglected to demonstrate more clearly what the present in the sense of presence means. Through this, being is unitarily determined as being-present and letting-be-present, i.e. as disclosure. What subject do we think about when we say being-present? Being [of being-present] means endurance. But we too quickly consider enduring as mere duration and take duration according to the usual conception of Time as a temporal stretch from one now to a later now. However, the talk about being-present demands that we conceive duration as lingering and abiding. Being-present is of concern to us; the present means abide towards us, us -- man.

Who are we? We remain cautious with the answer. Because it could be that that which distinguishes man as man is itself determined by that which we must think about here: man, who is concerned with being-present, who is present in his own way out of such concern to all which is present and absent.

man is in the midst of concern for being-present, but in such a way that he receives as a gift the being-present
which it gives, in so far as he perceives that which appears in being-present. If man were not the constant receiver of the gift from the "It gives being-present", if he did not get what is given in the gift, then not only would Being remain hidden and locked away but man would remain shut out of the realm of the It Gives Being. man would not be man.

Now it seems that with the indication about man we have come off the path on which we would like to contemplate what is proper to time. In a sense this is so. At the same time, we are the subject called time which should properly be seen on the basis of the present and being-present; we are this more nearly than we think.

Being-present entails the constant abiding which concerns man, which is reached by him, which reaches him, but whence this reaches reaching in which the present as being-present belongs in so far as presence is given? Granted, man remains always concerned with the being-present of some present being, without thereby truly paying attention to being-present itself. But just as often, i.e. always, we are concernead about being-absent. Sometimes so that much is not present in the way in which we know it from being-present in the sense of the present. Yet, also this no-longer-present is directly present in its being-absent, namely in the manner of the having-been-present which concerns us. This does not fall away out of the previous now like the merely past. The having-been-present is rather present in its own way. being-
present is reached in such a past.

Being-absent also concerns us in the sense of the not-yet-present in the manner of being-present in the sense of coming-towards-us. Talk about coming-towards-us has become jargonistic. One now hears, "The future has already begun", which is not the case, because the future never first begins, in so far as being-absent as the being-present of the not-yet-present always already concerns us in some way, i.e. is present in some way, just as directly as that which has-been-present. Being-present is reached in the future, in coming-towards-us.

If we pay more careful attention to what is said, we find in being-absent, whether that of the past or of the future, a manner of being-present and of concern which in no way corresponds to being-present in the sense of the direct present. Thus it should be noticed that not every being-present is necessarily in the present, strangely enough. And we do also find such being-present, namely that concern which reaches us, in the present. Being-present is also reached in the present.

How shall we determine this reaching of being-present which is at play in the past, present and future? Does this reaching consist in reaching us, or does it reach us because it is a reaching? The latter. Coming-towards as not-yet-present reaches and brings at the same time the no-longer-present,
the past, and conversely the past reaches the future. The interplay of these two reaches and brings the present at the same time. We say "at the same time" and thereby assign a temporal character to the reaching-each-other of future, past and present, i.e. to their proper unity.

This procedure is clearly not appropriate if we must call this unity of reaching and just this "Time". Because Time is itself nothing temporal any more than it is a being. Therefore we are forbidden from saying that future, past and present are "at the same time" present-at-hand. However their reaching-each-other does belong together. Their unifying unity can only be determined on the basis of what is proper to them, out of their reaching each other. But what do they reach to each other?

Nothing but themselves and that means the being-present which is reached in them. With this what we call Time-space lights up. However with the word Time we no longer mean the sequence of nows. Thus, Time-space no longer means the separation of two points of calculated Time as when we determine that such and such happened in the temporal space of 50 years. Time-space now names the open, which lights up in the reaching-each-other of future, past and present. The expense for the ordinarily known space is cleared first and only by this open. The lighting reaching-each-other of future, past and present is itself pre-spatial; only thereby can it
clear, i.e. give, room.

The ordinarily understood time-space in the sense of a measured separation of two temporal points is the result of temporal calculation. Through it, time conceived as a line and parameter and thereby one-dimensional is numerically measured off. The dimensionality of time so considered as the sequence of nows is borrowed from the conception of three-dimensional space.

That which is proper to the time-space of proper time is due to the lighting reaching-each-other of future, past and present before and independently of any temporal calculation. Thus proper time and only it is suitable to what we easily mistakenly call dimension. This suitability is due to the characterized lighting reaching, which as the future gives the past, as the past gives the future and as both of these movements gives the light of the open. On the basis of this three-fold reaching, proper time is shown to be three-dimensional. To repeat -- dimension is not here considered as the range of possible measuring, but as the reaching through, as the lighting reaching. This first permits a range of measurement to be considered and delimited.

But whence is the unity of the three dimensions of proper time determined, i.e. of the three ways of reaching of their respective being-present, which ways play in each other?
We already heard that a kind of concern and bringing, i.e. being-present, plays respectively in the coming-towards of the not-yet-present as well as in the having-been of the no-longer-present and in the present itself. We cannot assign this so conceived being-present to one of the three dimensions, like to the present. The unity of the three temporal dimensions is due much more to the interplay of each with each. This interplay shows itself to be the proper reaching which plays in that which is proper to Time as if it were the fourth dimension -- and not only as if, but as it is on the basis of the subject.

Proper Time is four-dimensional.

What we have counted as fourth is first according to the subject, i.e. it is the reaching which determines everything. In the future, past and present, it brings the being-present which is properly theirs, it holds them lit apart and it holds them together in the nearness from which the three dimensions remain seen together. Hence we name this first, original [seizing-upon] reaching, in which the unity of proper Time consists, the nearing near; "nearness" -- an early word which Kant had already used. But it brings future, past and present near each other by distancing them. Because it holds the past open by denying its future as the present. This nearing of the near holds the coming-towards out of the future open by withholding the present in coming. The nearing
near has the character of denial and withholding. It holds
the manners of reaching of past, future and present together
in their unity in advance.

Time is not. It gives Time. The giving which gives
Time is characterized by the denying-withholding near. It
furnishes the open of Time-space and preserves what is denied
in the past and what is withdrawn in the future. We name the
giving which gives proper Time the lighting-concealing
reaching. In so far as the reaching is itself a giving, proper
time conceals the giving of a giving.

But where are Time and Time-space? However forceful
the question may at first seem, we must no longer ask in such
a manner about a where, a place of Time. Because proper time
itself, the domain of the three-fold reaching characterized
by the nearing near, is the pre-spatial vicinity through which
a possible where is first given.

Since its beginning, philosophy asked where Time
belonged whenever it contemplated Time. One primarily had in
mind calculated Time as the passage of a sequence of nows.
One explained that counted Time, with which we calculate,
could not be given without psyche, without animus, without
soul, without consciousness, without spirit. Time is not
given without man. But what does this "not without" mean?
Is man the giver of Time or its receiver? And if the later, from whom does man receive Time? Is man first man in order to sometime (i.e. at some Time) receive Time and take up a connection to it? Proper Time is the nearness of being-present from present, past and future which unifies its three-fold lighting reaching. It has reached man in such a way that he can only be man by enduring its characteristic denying-withholding nearness. Time is not a power of man; man is not a power of Time. No power is given here. Only the giving in the sense of the afore-mentioned reaching which lights Time-space is given.

However, granted that the manner of giving in which Time is given needs the present characterization, we still stand puzzled before the It which we name in saying It gives Time, It gives Being. The danger arises that we arbitrarily apply an indeterminate power with the naming of the "It," a power which supposedly achieves all giving of Being and of Time. We can offset the indeterminacy and the arbitrariness by sticking with the characterization of the giving which we tried to show on the basis of the foresight into Being as being-present and into Time as the domain of the reaching of the light of a manifold being-present. The giving in "It gives Being" shows itself as sending and as the destiny of being-present in its epochal changes.

The giving in "It gives Time" shows itself as the
lighting reaching of the four-dimensional domain.

In so far as the likes of Time announces itself in being as being-present, the previous presumption is strengthened that proper Time, the four-fold reaching of the open, lets itself be discovered as the "It" which gives Being, i.e. being-present. The presumption seems fully justified if we notice that being-absent also always announces itself as being-present. Now, that manner of lighting reaching, which gives all being-present in the open, shows itself in the past, which allows the no-longer-present to be present by denying the present, and shows itself in the coming-towards-us, which allows the not-yet-present to be present by withholding the present.

Thus proper Time appears as the It which we name in saying, It gives Being. Destiny, in which being is given, consists in the reaching of Time. Does Time prove itself in this demonstration to be the It which gives Being? -- By no means. Because Time itself remains the gift of an It gives, whose giving preserves the domain in which being-present is reached. The It thus remains indeterminate, puzzling, and we remain puzzled. In such a case it is advisable to determine the It, which gives, on the basis of the previously characterized giving. This shows itself as the sending of Being, as Time in the sense of the lighting reaching.

(Or are we only puzzled because we are letting
language, or rather the grammatical analysis of language, lead us into an error in which we store at an It which is supposed to be given but which is simply not given. When we say, It gives Being, It gives Time, we are speaking sentences. Grammatically, a sentence consists of subject and predicate. Its subject need not necessarily be a subject in the sense of an I or a person. Grammar and logic use the It-sentence as an impersonal or subjectless sentence. In other Indo-Germanic languages, in Greek and Latin, the It is lacking, at least as a special word and sound complex, but that does not mean that what is meant by the It is not thought: in the Latin pluit, it is raining; in the Greek κρέ, it is necessary.

(But what does this "It" mean? linguistics and philosophy of language have contemplated this considerably without a good clarification having been found. The domain of meaning meant by the It reaches from the insignificant to the demonic. The It said in the talk of "It gives Being", "It gives Time" may name something exceptional which cannot be gone into here. Therefore we limit ourselves to a fundamental consideration.

(According to the grammatico-logical analysis, that which is talked about shows itself as the subject, ἐνοπολογισμὸν, the already somehow present-being. What is said about the subject as predicate shows itself as the already present-being-with with the present-being, the συμβεβεβολογισμὸν, accident: the lecture hall is lighted. In the "It" of the "It gives Being", a being-present of some-
thing which is present, thus in a certain sense a being, speaks. If we put this in place of the It, then the sentence, "It gives Being", says as much as: "Being gives Being". With that we are thrown back to the difficulty stated at the lecture's start: Being is. But Being is just as little as Time is. So let us drop the attempt to characterize the "It" in isolation. But let us retain in view that the It names, at least in the most readily available analysis, a being-present of being-absent.

(In saying, "It gives Being", "It gives Time", we are not dealing with propositions about beings, although the sentence structure has been passed down by the Greco-Roman grammarians entirely with such propositions in mind. In view of this, we must be alert to the possibility that in saying, "It gives Being", "It gives Time", we are not, despite all appearances, dealing with propositions which are frozen in the sentence structure of the subject-predicate connection. But how else can we bring into view what is said in "It gives being", "It gives Time"? Simply by thinking of the "It" on the basis of the giving which belongs to it: the giving as destiny, the giving as lighting reaching. Both belong together insofar as the former, destiny, consists in the later, lighting reaching.)

In the sending of the destiny of being and in the reaching of time a dedication, a transfer, shows itself,
namely of Being as presence and of Time as the domain of the open to what is proper to them. What determines both, Time and Being, in what is proper to them, i.e. in their belonging together, we call appropriation. What this word means we can only think about on the basis of what announces itself in the fore-sight of Being and of Time as destiny and as reaching, in which Time and Being belong. We called both, Being as well as Time, subjects. The "and" between them left their connection to one another indeterminate.

Now we see that what lets both subjects belong to each other, what not only brings both subjects into their proper, but preserves them in their belonging together and holds them in it, the relation of the two subjects, the subject-relation, is appropriation. The subject-relation is not tacked on to Being and Time later as a stuck-on relationship. The subject-relation first appropriates Being and Time out of their relationship to what is proper to them and through the appropriation which hides itself in destiny and in lighting reaching. Hence the It, which gives, certifies itself as the appropriation in "It gives Being", "It gives Time". The proposition is correct and yet at the same time false, i.e. it hides the subject-relation from us; because unnoticed we have imagined it as something being present, while we are trying to think about presence as such. But perhaps we can have all the difficulties, all the detailed and apparently fruitless descriptions removed if we finally ask the simple.

*The German "Ereignis" commonly means "event", but is used by Heidegger in a way which makes "appropriation" with its etymology and connotations, a more appropriate translation for this central term.
question: what is appropriation?

An intermediate question is allowed here. What do "to answer" and "the answer" mean here? To answer means to say that which speaks to the subject-relation which is to be thought about here, i.e. appropriation. But if the subject-relation forbids talking about it in the manner of a proposition, then we must renounce the proposition which is anticipated by the posed question. However this means accepting the impossibility of thinking appropriately about that which is to be thought about. Or is it more advisable to renounce not only the answer but even the question? Because what is the status of this illuminatingly qualified, unramified posed question: what is appropriation? Here we are questioning the what-being [what-ness], the Being [essence], the way in which appropriation is, i.e. is-present.

With the apparently harmless question, What is appropriation?, we seek information about the Being of appropriation. But if Being now proves to be something which belongs in appropriation and which receives the characterization of presence from it, then we fall back with our question to that which above all else is missing its characterization: Being out of Time. This characterization shows itself out of the fore-sight of the "It" which gives, in looking through the intertwined manners of giving, sending and reaching. Sending of Being consists in the lighting-concealing reaching
of the manifold being-present in the open domain of Time-space. But reaching and sending depend on appropriation. This, i.e. this which is proper to appropriation, also determines the sense of that which is here called dependence.

This permits -- in a sense, necessitates -- saying how appropriation is not to be thought about. We can no longer understand what is named "appropriation" on the basis of the word's common meaning, because that would be to understand it in the sense of event or happening -- not on the basis of making proper as the lighted preserving reaching and sending.

Thus it is announced that the unifying of the European Common Market is an event of world-historical significance. If the word "appropriation" appears in connection with a description of Being and if one hears this word only with the ordinary meaning of "event", then it clearly obtrudes upon speaking of the appropriation of Being. Because without Being, no being can be as such. Accordingly, Being can be taken for the highest, for the most important event.

But the whole point of this lecture was to bring into view Being itself as appropriation. Only that which is named with the word "appropriation" says something completely different. Accordingly, the "as", which is unapparent and

*In this paragraph alone, where Heidegger is discussing its common meaning, "Ereignis" is sometimes translated as "event" rather than "appropriation." Cf. previous footnote.
always entangled because ambiguous, must be thought about. Even assuming that we forsake the usual meaning of the word "appropriation" for the description of Being and Time and instead use the meaning given in the sending of presence and the lighting reaching of the time-space, then the talk about "Being as appropriation" is still indefinite.

"Being as appropriation" -- earlier, philosophy thought about Being on the basis of beings as idea, as energia, as actualitas, as will and now -- one might think -- as appropriation. So understood, appropriation means a transformed explication of Being which, if it is valid, presents an advance in metaphysics. In such a case the "as" would mean appropriation as a kind of being, ordered under Being which forms the permanent main concept. But if we think in the manner attempted of Being in the sense of being-present and letting-be-present which is given in destiny which in turn depends upon the lighted-concealed reaching of proper time, then Being belongs to appropriation. From this the giving and its gift receive their determination. Then Being would be a kind of appropriation and not appropriation a kind of Being.

The flight to such a reversal would be too cheap. It would pass by the state of affairs in thinking. Appropriation is not the encompassing highest concept under which Being and Time can be ordered. Logical ordering
connections have nothing to say here. Because by our reflecting upon Being itself and by following what is proper to it, it proves itself to be the gift of the destiny of being-present which is preserved in the reaching of Time. The gift of being-present is the property of appropriation. Being vanishes in appropriation. In the expression, "Being as appropriation," the "as" now means Being, letting-be-present sent in appropriation, Time reached in appropriation. Time and Being appropriated in appropriation. And what about this appropriation itself? Can more be said about appropriation?

More has been thought here than was properly stated, namely that to giving as sending there belongs a restraint, namely that in the reaching of past and future a denial and withholding of present are at play. What are now named -- restraint, denial, withholding -- show the likes of a self-removal or a pulling-back. However, as long as the manners of giving, sending and reaching are determined by and dependent upon appropriation, pulling back must belong to what is proper to appropriation. A discussion of this is beyond the scope of the present lecture.

(With brevity and insufficiently, according to the manner of a lecture, we have hinted at what is proper in appropriation.

( The sending in the destiny of Being was charac-
terized as a giving, whereby the sent restrained itself and in its restraint removed the disclosure.

( In proper Time and its Time-space, the reaching of the past, i.e. of the no-longer-present, shows the denial of the present. In the reaching of the future, i.e. of the not-yet-present, is shown the withholding of the present. Denial and withholding announce the same pulling as the restraint in sending, namely the self-removal.

( In so far as the destiny of Being is due to the reaching of Time and they are together due to appropriation, that which is proper, which removes its most proper from the unrestrained disclosure, is announced in appropriation. Considered on the basis of appropriation, this means that it appropriates itself in the named sense of itself. To appropriation as such belongs expropriation. Appropriation does not give itself up in this, but rather preserves its property.

( We glimpse the other thing which is proper to appropriation as soon as we think clearly enough about what has already been stated. In Being as being-present, is announced the process which concerns us men so, that we have acquired the characteristic of humanity in the perception and acceptance of this process. This acceptance of the process of being-present is however due to standing within the region
of reaching, as which four-dimensional proper Time has reached us.

( In so far as Being and Time are only given in appropriating, to this belongs the proper, which brings man into his proper as he who perceives Being by standing within proper Time. As such, man properly belongs in the appropriation.

( This belonging is due to the making proper which characterizes appropriation. Through it, man is let into the appropriation. Because of this, we can never stand the appropriation in front of ourselves, neither as an object nor as the all-encompassing. Therefore representational-found ing thinking accords with the appropriation as little as merely propositional speech.)

In so far as both Time and Being as the giving of appropriating can only be thought about on the basis of the later, the relationship of space to appropriation must accordingly be considered. This can clearly only succeed when we have already seen into the origin of space in the sufficiently considered proper of place. (Cf. "Build Live Think", 1951, in Vorträge und Aufsätze, Heidegger, 1954, p.145ff).

The attempt in Being and Time §70 to trace the spatiality of Dasein back to temporality can not be ended.
In peering through Being itself, through Time itself, in glancing at the destiny of Being and the reaching of Time-space, what "appropriation" says becomes glimpseable. But do we gain anything but a mere edifice of thoughts in this way? In the retention of this suspicion, speaks the opinion that appropriation must after all "be" a being. However, appropriation neither is not is it given. To say either is to confuse the state of affairs, just as if we wanted to lead a spring out of its stream.

What remains to be said? Only this: the appropriation appropriates. With this we say the same from the same to the same. This appears to say nothing. And it does say nothing as long as we hear what is said as a mere sentence and surrender its examination to logic. But what if we accept what was said inescapably as the topic of concern for contemplation and consider that this same is not something new, but the oldest of the old in Western thought, the ancient which hides itself in the name α- lethia? From that which was dictated in this beginning of all leit motifs of thought, a constraint speaks which binds every thinking, assuming it needs the call of that which is to be thought about.

The point was to think about Being proper by peering through proper time -- on the basis of the appropriation -- without reference to the connection of Being to beings.
To think about being without beings means to think about being without reference to metaphysics. Such a reference is however still dominant in the attempt to overcome metaphysics. Therefore the point is to dispense with overcoming and to abandon metaphysics itself.

If an overcoming remains necessary, then it concerns that thinking which properly has to do with the appropriation, in order to say it from it and toward it.

The point is inescapably to overcome the obstacles which easily make such a speaking insufficient.

Speaking about the appropriation in the manner of a lecture also remains an obstacle of this sort. It has only been spoken in sentences.